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HAZARD PERCEPTION AND REPORTING 
Ewan Douglas*, Sam Cromie, Chiara Leva 
Centre for Innovative Human Systems – Trinity College Dublin – Ireland 
 
Reporting of hazards is a key aspect of safety management in 
industry, but relatively little empirical investigation of reporting 
has been undertaken. This research reports on an investigation that 
was carried out in the Science gallery at Trinity College Dublin to 
explore the detection and reporting of hazards by members of the 
public. Three simulated hazards were developed and placed around 
the risk lab. The experiment was designed to assess the capacity to 
recall recognise and report hazards of the participants by means of 
an exit survey. Participants performed better at recognition than 
recollection with no actual reporting of hazards recorded. The 
results validated some of the findings suggested by the literature 
and can assist in the development of a new experimental 
methodology as training within organizations to improve 
awareness of hazards and reporting practices.  
Introduction  
Across many industries there is now a requirement for the implementation of a 
Safety Management System (SMS) including proactive risk assessment  
(Leveson 2011). For example, within the aerospace industry there is the 
European policy for aeronautical repair stations (EASA 145) which specifies a 
requirement for collecting proactive information on risks and hazards as they are 
encountered within the life cycle of the organisation (Pérezgonzález, McDonald, 
& Smith, 2005). A reporting system is an effective way of addressing these 
requirements and collecting information on hazards from the workforce. Many 
reporting approaches use reports submitted from the “shop floor” as one of the 
inputs on risk and hazards that will be managed by the SMS.  There has been 
significant literature on the factors that can influence the level of reporting within 
the organisation from the design of the data collection forms, to the procedure, to 
cultural considerations of the SMS system (Johnson, 2003; Leveson, 2011). 
However, before reporting a hazard, the reporter has to successfully notice and 
identify the hazard.  The literature in the area to date has not investigated this 
aspect of reporting. The study reported here took advantage of an exhibition 
called the “Risk Lab” in the Science Gallery in Trinity College Dublin to explore  
the rate at which the general public will notice, identify and report hazards. 
Although outside an industrial setting, the hazards used in the study represented 
a clear and recognisable danger to the public.  
Existing efforts to stimulate hazard reporting within Industry 
Several studies have looked at developing a proactive approach to risk 
management; a recent example can be found in Leva, et al. (2010) where a 
proactive “daily journal” was developed and implemented in a small Italian 
regional airport.  The new methodology rolled out was a web-based tool 
consisting of an anomaly log that should be completed by ground staff after each 
aircraft “turnaround”. The anomaly log, while providing immediate benefits to 
the ground staff by assisting in the shift handover procedures, also collects 
proactive data on anomalies that are encountered during each turnaround 
allowing these anomalies to be captured immediately after they occur (Leva, 
Mcdonald, et al., 2010). Literature such as Wiegmann & von Thaden, (2003) 
highlight the importance of collecting data on anomalies and incidents 
immediately after the actual occurrence of an incident. Leveson, (2011) 
highlights the importance of designing a suitable reporting form to allow the 
reporters to provide the information they want to provide without being an extra 
burden into their day-to-day workload.  Reporting approaches that are 
cumbersome or add more paperwork to already overburdened staff can act as a 
barrier to reporting. Furthermore, the reporting system should be designed with 
the objective of delivering benefits to the day-to-day operations of the staff 
expected to use them (Kongsvik, Fenstad, & Wendelborg, 2012; Leva, Cahill, 
Kay, Losa, & McDonald, 2010)Therefore, communication and training about the 
benefits of the reporting system should also be provided to the staff. Industrial 
initiatives in this area all rely on staff seeing hazards, and then reporting them 
into some form of a system. The majority of the research so far has been on the 
procedure behind compiling a reporting form and its follow up and considerable 
effort is made to raise the awareness of hazards through, for example, posters or 
training, with the assumption that these will increase the detection and reporting 
of hazards. However there is a crucial question before this process can begin: 
Are the reporters able to notice and identify all relevant hazards? 
From Hazard detection to reporting 
This paper assumes that there are four steps in a reporting process: 1) witnessing 
a hazardous scenario, 2) identification of the scenario as hazardous, 3) risk 
assessment of the scenario, and 4) reporting. First, the individual needs to pay 
attention to the visual/auditory/olfactory/tactile stimuli that represent the hazard. 
There are several factors that could influence this process ranging from the 
salience of the hazard to the “unexpectedness”. Wogalter et al. (1999) suggest 
that hazard perception is affected by the likelihood of the hazard introducing a 
risk of injury to the reporter.  There are also environmental considerations to be 
taken into account: a busy loud environment can make some hazards harder to 
distinguish from the background noise. Personal experience has been found to 
have a significant role in hazard detection.  There have been studies on the 
hazard perception habits of new drivers (Deery, 1999) that show how 
inexperienced drivers will treat all hazards with a similar priority, while more 
experienced drivers will tend to assess hazards more proactively and prioritize 
them accordingly (Wiegmann & von Thaden, 2003).  (Deery, 1999), in a study 
of hazard perception with regards to driving age, found that age groups are non-
homogenous with regards to the level of risk perception and factors such as 
personality and task attitude can have a significant influence on how an 
individual perceives a hazard.  
Second, scenarios have to be sufficiently processed by the individual to be 
identified as hazardous. This study explores the level to which hazards are 
processed by asking participants to recall hazards. This was explored in two 
ways using a computer-based survey at the end of the exhibition. Participants 
were first asked to recall and note any hazards they had seen during the 
exhibition.  They were then presented with a set of “hazards” on the computer 
screen, some of which had been present during the exhibition and some which 
were not, to investigate if participants can recognize hazards that they may not 
have identified and recalled in the first place. The study draws on the levels of 
processing theory, which posits that the more cognitive processing are applied to 
stimuli the more readily accessible they will be (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). The 
hazard recall (i.e. being able to remember the hazard unprompted) is taken as an 
index of a deeper level of processing than recognition.   
Third, the hazard needs to be assessed as being of significant risk to be worthy of 
reporting, and then, fourth, reported. Steps three and four were measured 
together in terms of whether or not the hazards were reported.  
The objectives of the study were to: 
1. Examine the levels of reporting of reporting hazards from the general 
population  
2. Examine the difference between levels of recall and recollection of 
hazards from the general populations 
Method 
Design 
The investigation consisted of three hazards that varied in salience, size and 
“unexpectedness” located within the science gallery. Participants explored the 
Science Gallery exhibit where the hazards were located; however the hazards 
were not the focus of the exhibition. They were part of the environment as would 
be expected within an industrial setting.    
Reporting, recall and recognition were assessed by exit survey as participants 
were leaving the gallery. Recall was measured by means of a free text box that 
asked participants to report hazards that they had encountered in the risk lab. 
Then they were asked if they had reported any of these hazards to the Gallery 
staff (Reporting). Subsequently they were presented with pictures of the hazards 
and asked if they had seen that specific hazard during their visit (Recognition). 
False hazards, which were not present in the gallery, were included in this 
section to ensure genuine recognition was being measured.  
Participants  
The investigation was hosted within the “Risk Lab” exhibition at the “Science 
Gallery” at Trinity College Dublin, which was a free exhibition open to the 
public. 153 participants completed the exit survey, with a mean age of 26.6 years 
and a range of 37 years.  
Equipment and Materials 
A professional prop company produced three realistic (but not hazardous) 
hazards for the experiment. The three hazards were: a leaking chemical 
cupboard, a faulty switchbox and a leaking pipe. The “hazards” were placed 
around the risk lab exhibition before it was open to the public. The fuse box was 
placed near the entrance lobby, the pipe was placed in a busy corridor and the 
chemical cupboard was placed at the top of the main staircase in the exhibition.  
                                  
Figure 1 Switchbox 
Figure 1 is the switchbox hazard used.  As shown there is an inadequately 
secured panel on the side of the unit, several “tripped” circuit breakers and there 
was a device installed that simulated a blue light and sounds indicating electrical 
arcing occurring. The unit was designed to look as if it belonged in the science 
gallery owing to electrical piping joining the real piping in the environment.  
                                    
Figure 2 Chemical Cupboard 
The second hazard was the chemical cupboard shown in Figure 2. This consisted 
of a cupboard with a “staff only” sign, an open lock with the key left in, several 
containers with evident hazardous substance symbols being visible and a 
simulated leak onto the floor. 
                                         
Figure 3 Leaking Pipe 
The final hazard was a leaking pipe (shown in Figure 3). The pipe was placed 
beside identical real pipes, and held a pressure gauge showing a pressure reading 
in the red area and making occasional hissing noises.  
Data Collection  
The participants were asked to complete a short (approx. 1 min) survey before 
leaving the exhibition; the survey was hosted on an apple iPad running Survey 
Gizmo software.  
Results 
Figure 4 shows the results for the study in terms of hazard recall, recognition, 
and reporting rates to exhibition staff. The chemical cupboard had the highest 
rates of recognition, recall and was the only hazard that was reported to staff. 
51% of participants could recall having seen this hazard, as compared to 37% for 
the fusebox and 0% for the pipe. Recall rates for both the chemical cupboard and 
fusebox were lower than recognition rates, as would be expected. In total, only 
three people (approx. 2%) reported any hazard to the exhibition staff.  
 
Figure 4 Frequency of Recall and Recognition  
Discussion 
The objective of this study was to investigate the levels of reporting, recall and 
recognition of hazards by participants in the general population. Each of these 
will be discussed in this section. 
In the exit survey, participants were first asked to recall any hazards they had 
encountered during their visit. 33% of participants were able to recall a hazard 
from their time in the exhibition, suggesting that they had both witnessed the 
scenario and identified it as hazardous (steps 1 and 2 of a reporting process). 
Further, 51% of participants recognized the chemical cupboard hazard when 
presented with it, showing that they had witnessed the hazard (step 1) but had not 
necessarily identified it as hazardous (step 2). However, only three participants 
went on to report the hazard, suggesting that steps 3 and 4 of the reporting 
process were a blocker to reporting in this study.  
The main result from this study is the extremely low reporting of hazards to the 
exhibition staff. Of 153 participants who completed the exit survey, and the 
several hundred overall visitors to the exhibition, only three proactively reported 
a hazard. The participants may not have noticed the hazard to begin with (i.e. 
they did not witness a hazard). However, the recognition data shows that this was 
not the case for a large section of the participants. Secondly, the participants may 
not have identified that hazard, but again the recall data shows that this was not 
the case for a substantial section of the group. The data appears to show 
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unwillingness among the participants to proactively report hazards and a 
“filtering” of hazards through perceptual, cognitive and social processes. The 
hazards could be seen/heard by participants but were not identified as hazards 
until presented as such. Hazards were recalled that were not reported. As 
discussed earlier in the paper, a number of reasons are outlined in the literature to 
explain poor reporting. Wogalter et al (1999) suggested that the likelihood of 
injury may drive reporting and in this experiment the exhibition environment 
may have been perceived as a ‘safe’ area, meaning that participants did not 
expect to be injured during their visit. The literature also suggests that 
unexpected hazards are more likely to be reported than expected hazards which 
explains why the chemical cupboard was reported the highest as the fuse box and 
the pipe are features one would expect to find in this environment. The 
environment may also influence reporting; in this case, the busy and noisy 
environment of the Science Gallery may have reducing the ability of participants 
to notice the hazards, particularly the pipe which make a hissing noise but may 
not have been sufficiently loud to overcome background noise. The other 
exhibitions around the hazards were specifically designed to engage visitors and 
may have reduced their attention to their environment.  
The study was limited by the lack of control over the sample that was drawn 
from the general public meaning there may have been a mix of people from 
backgrounds with different levels of risk and hazard awareness. However, the 
size of the sample should provide some balance for this. The study also lacked 
control over the experimental conditions with varying levels of noise and 
busyness as well as a lack of ability to monitor participants during their visit. 
Future studies may replicate the experiment in a more controlled, industrial 
environment to collect results in a setting with higher face validity.  
The outcomes of this investigation provide lessons for the process of risk 
reporting within industry. In particular, the suggestion that a ‘safe’ environment 
generates less reports is also applicable in an industrial context and reinforces the 
messages from Safety Culture research around engaging staff and taking 
personal responsibility for safety, not expecting safety to be provided for them. 
Secondly, busy or noisy environments containing highly engaging activities may 
also reduce reporting as individuals focus on the specific aspect of the 
environment of interest. Staff within an organization will have to be more 
engaged and trained on hazard perception if good quality data is to be derived 
from a reporting system as the results are suggesting staff needs to be made 
aware of hazards and be involved in actively assessing them themselves if they 
are expected to remember and recall the hazards accurately. There is scope to use 
this experimental methodology as training within organizations to improve 
awareness of hazards and reporting practices. Furthermore there may be benefits 
to study possible alternatives in the actual physical methods of reporting to see 
which method may produce the best reports.  
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